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VALUING VIRTUE: MORALITY AND
PRODUCTIVITY IN POSNER'S THEORY
OF WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
ANNALISE E. ACORN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law and economics movement has been very influential in the legal
academy and legal practice in the last twenty years.' This has been the case
notwithstanding the existence of much strong and persuasive criticism of the
ethical foundations of the movement. Ronald Dworkin2 and Mark Kelman, 3
among others, 4 have leveled devastating criticisms against attempts to construct
the notion of efficiency within the theory of law and economics as an ethical
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta; Special Counsel, Alberta Law
Reform Institute; Member of the Bar of Alberta; B.A. University of Alberta (1982), LL.B.
University of Alberta (1985), B.C.L. Oxford (1988). I would like to thank Claude Denis, Kerry
Rittich, David Schneiderman, Bill Bogart, Bruce Ziff, and Robert Howse for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.
1. The extent and nature of the influence of the law and economics movement is difficult to
measure. For discussions of the influence of the law and economics movement in judicial reasoning,
see lzhak Englard, Law and Economics in American Tort Cases: A Critical Assessment of the
Theory's Impact on Courrs, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1991); Warren J. Samuels & Nicholas
Mercuro, Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 INT. REv. OF LAW & ECON. 107 (1984).
For further bibliography on Richard Posner's influence on the bench since his appointment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, see Englard, supra, at 361 n.4.
2. RONALD DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value? & Why Efficiency?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
237, 267 (1986). The ultimate import of the stories of Amartya and Derek at 242; the doctor and
the candy maker at 239, 252; and Agatha and Sir George at 254, is that wealth maximization favors
the advantaged for no justifiable reason.
3. MARK KELMAN, Legal Economists and Normative Social Theory and Legal Economists and
Conservative Preferences, in A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114, 151 (1987). As with
Dworkin's examples, Kelman's example of the position of Native Americans in relation to land
claims illustrates primarily that the notion of valuation favors the advantaged. Id. at 143. Once it
is decided that Native Americans do not own the land, it is impossible for them to value it more
highly than do the European settlers. Thus, their use of it is deemed inefficient. Id.
4. For a bibliographical note on other C.L.S. (Critical Legal Studies) critics of law and
economics' normative branch, see KELMAN, supra note 3, at 114 nn.1-2; see also Arthur A. Leff,
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974); Jules
L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); Morton
J. Horowitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 905 (1980); Lawrence
G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (1980); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 591
(1980); John M. Finnis, Allocating Risks and Suffering: Some Hidden Traps, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
193 (1990).
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norm. These thinkers have shown that a constitutive and foundational element
of the theory is that it favors the advantaged over the disadvantaged.' Law and
economics has, however, had an enduring and substantial effect even after these
criticisms have exposed its deep rejection of a principle of equality of
individuals.
The continued significance of law and economics in the face of these
criticisms can be explained by the fact that at its ethical foundation the
movement does, indeed, embrace the idea that the advantaged deserve to come
out ahead in the allocation of entitlements. Richard Posner, as the most daring
and explicit proponent of efficiency as an ethical norm, justified the favoring of
the advantaged by arguing that the advantaged are also productive and that
productive individuals are more deserving than unproductive individuals." In
his early work, Posner argued that wealth maximization, as a system of
allocating entitlements, was morally defensible because it both rewarded and
provided an incentive toward the moral virtue of productivity.7 It gave due
recognition to the moral distinction between production and consumption. The
substance of this moral distinction then purportedly justified the instances in
which wealth maximization favors those who are most able to value entitlements
in either the real or hypothetical market
There is a sense in which the egalitarian critics of law and economics, such
as Dworkin and Kelman, in criticizing Posner's work on wealth maximization,
took him too seriously as a moral and legal philosopher and not seriously
enough as a lawyerly rhetorician of the political right.9 However, we cannot
now consider the debate to be one of the past. The morality of efficiency has
recently been making gains on a number of fronts. The metaphor of the big pie
and the notion of efficiency as an ethical norm have been revitalized by the
perceived significance of the overthrow of the Communist regimes in Eastern
5. I am borrowing this definition of the right inferentially from Philippe Van Parijs, Basic
Income Capitalism, 102 ETICS 465, 469 (1992), who suggests a definition of the left/right axis as
the degree to which a position caters for the interests of the least advantaged.
6. RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 66 (1981) [hereinafter POSNER,
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE].
7. Id. at 66-69. Posner reiterates this view, while backing off of some of his other claims about
the viability of wealth maximization as an ethical norm in Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE
DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85, 97-99 (1985) [hereinafter Posner, Wealth Maximization
Revisited].
8. For a discussion of the ways in which wealth maximization theoretically justifies the coercion
and even the slaughter of the unproductive, see Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 602.
9. Kelman argues that the normative theory behind law and economics goes beyond simply
being the narration of the political right in the legal sphere, and is also an attempt to resolve the
ongoing difficulty of the relationship between law and politics. Law and economics theory views
law as the apolitical efficient allocation of entitlements, and thereby separates law from politics,
which is concerned with distributional goals. KELMAN, supra note 3, at 125.
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Europe. " Exposure of the anti-egalitarian strands of efficiency as a moral
norm has not ousted efficiency from the realm of moral discourse." Thus,
both the questions about the moral significance of efficiency and material
productivity, and the relative desserts of productive and unproductive individuals
require re-examination.
It is not, however, the question of whether efficiency as a norm favors the
advantaged that I want to discuss here. Rather, what I want to do is to re-
examine Posner's defense of wealth maximization as an ethical principle and to
ask how Posner and other followers of the school of law and economics defend
the view that it is morally desirable to favor the advantaged. In this, I, too, may
be accused of taking Posner too seriously as a moral philosopher instead of
simply dismissing him as an apologist in the legal arena for right wing
orthodoxy. However, I propose to analyze his defense of the political right at
the point where I think it is most in need of analysis, that is, in his argument
that the advantaged are more deserving and that a system of legal decision-
making that favors the advantaged is morally attractive. Therefore, I shall
attempt to take the assertion that there is an important relationship between
morality and productivity at its strongest. I shall try to determine whether there
are any convincing arguments to be made about the moral significance of
productivity, and further, whether such arguments could be inserted into the
ethical foundations of law and economics to give it fuller normative appeal.
I shall first examine the argument that productivity is morally significant
because it is through productive activity that one contributes to the lives of
others. On this view, productive individuals may be viewed as morally superior
to unproductive individuals because, through the creation of goods or services
to be enjoyed by others, they give to society rather than merely taking from it
through consumption. This view is engaged by Posner's discussion of the moral
significance of the creation of a consumer surplus.
Secondly, because Posner invokes Calvinism in his normative defense of
wealth maximization, I shall examine the Calvinist emphasis on productivity as
it was fleshed out in the idea of work in a calling. The Calvinist ethic of
productivity is deeply self-negating and is centered around the idea that by
imposing order on the external world through productive activity, the individual
10. John E. Roemer, The Morality and Efficiency of Market Socialism, 102 ETHIcS 448, 451
(1992). See generally Symposium on Markets and Equality Under Capitalism and Socialism, 102
ETHICs 447 (1992).
11. Even the Democratic party's 1992 platform engaged the notion of the moral significance
of productivity, speaking in terms of honoring business as a noble endeavor. THE REPORT OF THE
PLATFORM COMMIrrTEETO THE DEmOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 1992, at 3 (Ronald H. Brown
chairman, 1992).
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engages in the submission of his'2 will to that of God. Productivity is seen as
providing a means of religious redemption for the individual. I shall ask about
whether it is possible to factor out the religious aspect of the notion of the
calling to discover any ethically convincing argument about the significance of
productivity within it.
The third argument I shall address concerning the ethical significance of
material productivity is that of Karl Marx. It is, of course, unlikely that Marxist
theory on the relationship of productivity to personal fulfillment would be
compatible with Posnerian ethical theory. Nevertheless, I think that it is
instructive to examine the ways in which both thinkers posit productivity as, in
some sense, central to good human life. I shall, therefore, discuss Marx's view
of productivity as self-realization. I shall discuss some of the strengths and
limitations of Marx's theory in this regard, and I shall explore some of the
reasons why Marx's ideas about the significance of creativity cannot be
harnessed by Posner to support his conclusion that productive individuals are
morally more deserving.
In discussing these various arguments for the significance of productivity,
I shall also ask whether Posner's use of the notion of productivity is consistent
with any of these rationales for treating efficiency as morally significant.
Additionally, I will question whether Posner's favoring of the advantaged at the
theoretical level can be justified by reference to the moral distinction he draws
between production and consumption. I shall argue that even though there are
defensible reasons for positing productivity as morally significant, these reasons
are not available to Posner, given the substance of the rest of his theory. Thus,
I hope to add further support to the view that the theory of wealth maximization
does not provide an acceptable moral justification for its conclusions about the
allocation of legal entitlements.
Before proceeding, however, I shall explain both the continuing significance
of Posner's early normative theory as well as the role that the morality of
productivity plays in it.
II. THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF POSNER'S
EARLY NORMATIVE THEORY
I propose now to turn to Posner's exposition of wealth maximization as a
moral theory primarily as it appears in the first section of Posner's book, The
12. I will use a masculine pronoun where the text I am dealing with assumes a male subject.
For a discussion of the distortion inherent in assuming that masculine texts can be rehabilitated by
inserting the feminine pronoun, see SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 11
(1989).
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Economics of Justice.3 It may be objected that this text, now more than ten
years old, was eccentric when it was first published and, in any event, no longer
enjoys a reputation of being the foundation of the theory. It is, indeed, the case
that Posner has backed off from his espousal of wealth maximization as an
ethical norm and has repudiated many of the claims he made in his earlier work
defending the normative branch of his theory.14 However, the text remains of
importance because it is here that Posner squarely addressed the question of how
it can be ethically permissible for law and economics to reject a principle of
equality.
The necessity of looking to Posner's earlier work can be shown through an
examination of his more recent and more measured defense of the moral
justification of law and economics. In a debate with Robin Paul Malloy entitled
Is Law and Economics Moral?, Posner argues that wealth maximization, rather
than being a moral theory as such, abandons the sinking ship of moral discourse
and replaces it with a pragmatic means of producing fair resolutions of difficult
social and legal problems. 5 This defense of wealth maximization is, in its
structure, much like arguments put forward to defend procedural liberalism.' 6
This defense is advanced as follows: Decisions about who is entitled to what are
very controversial in our society. Pluralistic societies are, by definition, lacking
in consensus on matters of morality. Therefore, in making decisions about
social policy and law, it is a good thing (in such a society) to have a system that
will yield answers not contingent upon the adoption of any particular moral
philosophy or world view. Such a system will defuse these issues of their
controversial nature to some extent and will provide policies with which
everyone can be reasonably satisfied. Thus, Posner argues that with respect to
a controversial issue like surrogate motherhood, one can determine policies on
such an issue without engaging in a lot of very messy and indeterminate talk of
the commodification of children, exploitation of women, rights of the genetic
father, and the like, simply by asking what policies will be wealth
maximizing."
Of course, flipping a coin is another means of decision-making which
"abstracts from controversial issues."' It is not, on that basis, an attractive
method for creating social policy, deciding upon the structure of institutions, or
13. See POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 163
(1990) [hereinafter Posner, Law & Economics]. Other revisions of his defense of wealth
maximization are found in Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, supra note 7, and POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 374-87 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE].
15. Posner, Law & Economics, supra note 14, at 163.
16. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972).
17. Posner, Law & Economics, supra note 14, at 169.
18. Id.
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allocating legal entitlements. The reason why this sort of procedural argument
is compelling, in the context of a theory advanced by a liberal like Rawls, is not
simply that it provides a means for resolving issues without appeal to
controversial conceptions of the good. Rawls does, indeed, identify or construct
a necessity to pull out of discussion matters on which people would necessarily
disagree, and his argument for the justness of the theory is, in some measure,
based on his conviction that the recognition and accommodation of that
perceived necessity is extremely important. However, he does not claim that the
recognition of this need, on its own, could sustain the persuasiveness of his
theory. Rather, the theory's legitimacy on its own terms rests upon the truth of
its claim that in devising procedures for the creation of social order, it treats
individuals equally and evenhandedly respects their various claims to live
according to their own conceptions of the good. 9
Posner's theory of wealth maximization does not claim any such ambition.
In creating a procedure for the resolution of questions it does not even ostensibly
seek to treat individuals equally. It does, however, seek to treat dollars equally.
Posner argues that the merit of this position is that once one becomes concerned
with questions of how much a dollar means to each individual, one is once again
mired in controversial distributive concerns, and the cleanliness of the economic
approach is lost.2' It seems relatively obvious, however, that in treating each
dollar equally rather than each individual equally, wealth maximization again
favors those with more dollars.
Thus, we can see that in attempting to rehabilitate his ethical defense of
wealth maximization and to provide it with a somewhat more sophisticated
ethical foundation by borrowing from the logic of procedural liberalism, Posner
has not deflected the concern that wealth maximization is immoral because it
favors the advantaged. It is for this reason that I would argue that we must
return to the points at which Posner has openly embraced the conclusion that his
theory is not egalitarian and that it does and should favor the advantaged. We
can see in his earlier work that Posner accepts the conclusion that wealth
maximization openly rejects the egalitarianism of Rawls' theory. In comparing
wealth maximization to Rawls' principles of justice, Posner says:
19. RAWLs, supra note 16, at 19. "It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the
original position are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing
principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance and so on. Obviously the
purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as
creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice." Id.
20. See Posner, Law & Economics, supra note 14, at 167, where he writes: "I will give you
an example of how a distributive consideration-the attempt to weigh dollars according to who holds
them-complicates public policy analysis, and how wealth maximization provides a cleaner
approach."
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[A]ny theory of consent that is based on choice in the original position
is unsatisfactory.., because the original-position approach opens the
door to the claims of the nonproductive. In the original position, no
one knows whether he has productive capabilities, so choices made in
that position will presumably reflect some probability that the
individual making the choice will turn out to be an unproductive
member of society-perhaps one of Nozick's "utility monsters." The
original position approach thus obscures the important moral
distinction between capacity to enjoy and capacity to produce for
others. 2'
In Posner's later writings he abandons his initial claim to the
comprehensiveness of wealth maximization as a norm.' However, it is
instructive to examine the theory in its earlier and stronger formulation since it
is here that we see most clearly the nature of the claim that efficiency makes to
moral authority. Once Posner is put on his guard, we get less of an insight into
the underlying assumptions of the law and economics movement. If we assume,
as I think we must, that law and economics requires some ethical justification
as a theory about how entitlements should be allocated, then it is necessary to
return to these initial discussions, since it is there that the concern of
egalitarianism is addressed, and it is there that we find answers to questions
about why the law and economics movement has been so seductive to this
generation of lawyers.
III. THE ROLE OF PRODUCTIVITY IN POSNER'S NORMATIVE THEORY
In The Economics of Justice, Posner argued that it is morally good to place
goods, broadly defined, in the hands of those who value them most. The
infinitive "to value" is very narrowly defined and refers to capability and
willingness to pay money for goods. Legal rules that place goods in the
21. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 100. It is interesting to note that this
chapter, which is a reprint of Posner's original article, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudicarion, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 498-99 (1980), contains
some changes. The earlier version contained the words "not to be endowed with any such
capabilities" in place of "to be an unproductive member of society-perhaps one of Nozick's 'utility
monsters.'" A further sentence which reads, "In effect, the choices of the unproductive are weighed
equally with those of the productive," is omitted. It would seem then that in the later version Posner
is more blatant in his attempt to link non-productivity to moral turpitude, by suggesting that the
unproductive individual might be a torturer of others while at the same time he deletes the express
recognition that wealth maximization does not treat individuals equally. For Mark Keman's
discussion of this passage, see KELmAN, supra note 3, at 144. Kelman uses the term "anti-
egalitarian" to describe the theory.
22. Posner, Law & Economics, supra note 14.
23. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 60-61.
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hands of those who value them most are wealth maximizing. Although utility
and wealth are presented as quite different concepts,' the principle of wealth
maximization operates, broadly speaking, in the same manner as the principle
of utility in classical utilitarianism. Like the principle of utility, the principle
of wealth maximization purports to transcend the dichotomy between the right
and the good, defining both justice and goodness in terms of the maximization
of wealth.
Posner begins his defense of wealth maximization by arguing that its
normative appeal is revealed in its application to practical situations. It is here
that wealth maximization purports to have incorporated the virtues of both
utilitarianism and Kantian morality and the flaws of neither.'5 Essentially, the
claim is that the utilitarian difficulty with sacrificing the individual on the altar
of public expediency is eliminated by the requirement of consent. Unless
transaction costs are prohibitively high, an individual cannot be deprived of an
entitlement unless he or she consents to a transfer of that entitlement in the
actual market.' Free operation of the market determines most accurately who
values what most.' If, for example, black people are not willing to sell the
right to live in a particular neighborhood at the price that whites are willing to
pay to have them excluded, then allowing them to remain in the neighborhood
is wealth maximizing because the black people value the entitlement more than
the whites.' Thus, it is argued that wealth maximization improves upon
utilitarianism because neither the white neighbors' happiness at excluding blacks,
nor the black neighbors' unhappiness at being excluded figure in the moral
assessment of the situation.
Posner further argues that wealth maximization is purged of the moral
fanaticism of Kantian theory. Kantian moral squeamishness and inability ever
to recognize the correctness of sometimes balancing individual interests against
the collective welfare is eliminated by wealth maximization since the existence
of prohibitive transaction costs will allow for a non-consensual transfer of
entitlements where express consent is too costly to obtain."
One of the ways in which Posner's critics have exposed wealth
maximization as giving even greater advantages to the already privileged is by
discussing the difficulties that arise in relation to the initial setting of
24. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 60.
25. Id. at 66.
26. Id. at 70.
27. Id. at 79.
28. Id. at 85.
29. Id. at 62.
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entitlements.' The more one has in the first place, the less likely one is to
find oneself in a position unable either to obtain or retain, for example, the right
not to being excluded from a neighborhood or the right not to be tortured.
Similarly, the more one has to start off with, the more one is able "to value"
and, thereby, to accumulate further entitlements. Consent is a function of power
in the market, and power in the market is determined by actual holdings. Thus,
Posner's appeal to the cleansing properties of consent does not provide wealth
maximization with an answer to the persistent objection that it systematically
favors those with more material wealth.
Again, it is at this point that we begin to see Posner embracing and
defending wealth maximization's rejection of egalitarianism on the basis of the
moral quality of productivity. Posner explicates the moral significance of one's
ability "to value" through the use of examples. He asks us to compare our
moral evaluation of a man who steals a diamond necklace with a man who pays
$10,000 for a necklace." Two facts are relevant to our moral assessment of
the buyer. First, that he engaged in a consensual transaction with the seller, and
second, that he had $10,000 to spend on a necklace. The first is morally
relevant because the seller's consent to the transaction proves that it was of
benefit to him. Thus, the buyer is said to have conferred a benefit upon the
seller and has made the seller's situation better. Presumably, this benefit is the
difference between the $10,000 and what the seller would have taken for the
necklace. If the seller would have sold the necklace for $9000, then the buyer
has conferred an additional benefit of $1000 on the seller. If, however, the
seller would not have sold the necklace for a penny less than $10,000, then
presumably there is at least still some quantifiable benefit to the seller in
liquidating the asset. Thus, in Posner's view, simply to engage in consensual
transactions is morally good because although one acts in one's own self-
interest, one improves the lot of those with whom one transacts.
Secondly, the fact that the purchaser has $10,000 to spend on a necklace
is morally relevant because it is evidence of productivity. Posner argues that the
fact that a person has a lot of money usually reflects that person's production of
many benefits for others. One makes money by producing things that others
value. Through this productive activity one creates a consumer surplus, which
30. The original idea that, in a world of no transaction costs, all entitlements would end up in
the hands of the person who values them most, no matter where they are originally located, comes
from R.H. Coase's seminal article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). For
a discussion of the difficulties arising out of the issue of initial entitlements, see DWORKIN, supra
note 2, at 238, 254; KELMAN, supra note 3, at 142. Posner's responses to these criticisms can be
found in Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, supra note 7, at 90-95, and POSNER, PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 14, at 375-77.
31. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 65.
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is the amount that the purchaser would have paid over and above what he did
pay for a good or service produced. Posner says:
Moreover, the buyer's $10,000 was in all likelihood accumulated
through productive activity-that is, activity beneficial to other people
besides himself, whether to his employer, customers, or his father's
customers.' If we assume that a person's income is less than the
total value of his production, it follows that the productive individual
puts into society more than he takes out of it. Hence, not only does
the buyer in our example confer a net benefit on the owner of the
necklace (who would not accept $10,000 otherwise), but at every stage
in the accumulation of that money through productive activity, net
benefits were conferred on other people besides the producer. The
thief in contrast provides no benefit to the owner of the necklace or to
anyone else.33
In explaining the affront to our moral sensibilities posed by the
unproductive, Posner says:
Lawfully obtained wealth is created by doing things for other
people-offering them advantageous trades. The individual may be
completely selfish but he cannot, in a well-regulated market economy,
promote his self-interest without benefiting others as well as himself.
This may be why laziness is a disfavored trait in our society. The
lazy person substitutes leisure-which does not produce any consumer
surplus for the rest of society to enjoy-for work which does.'
Posner does parenthetically recognize the contentious nature of the claim
that people who succeed in the free market may be presumed to be morally
superior to those who do not. In a footnote to his initial discussion of the moral
superiority of the productive, he quotes Ruskin as saying that:
In a community regulated only by the laws of supply and demand, but
32. It is interesting that Posner invokes the image of the family business here in painting the
picture of the diligent upper middle class male entrepreneur.
33. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUsTIcE, supra note 6, at 66.
34. Id. at 83. See also id. at 83 n.62, where Posner, in distinguishing wealth maximization
from utility, goes on to say: "It may not be completely coincidental that nineteenth-century English
thought which in its philosophical aspect was dominated by utilitarianism, in its literary aspect
celebrated idleness-escaping from trade to the genteel pottering of the country squire's life. These
seemingly opposed tendencies are united by a preoccupation with the pursuit of happiness, in which
productive activity need not figure. The man who leads a contemplative, withdrawn rural life may
be happier than the captain of industry, but he will also produce a smaller surplus for the rest of
society to enjoy."
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protected from open violence, the persons who become rich are,
generally speaking, industrious, resolute, proud, covetous, prompt,
methodical, sensible, unimaginative, insensitive, and ignorant. The
persons who remain poor are the entirely foolish, the entirely wise,
the idle, the reckless, the humble, the thoughtful, the dull, the
imaginative, the sensitive, the well informed, the improvident, the
irregularly and impulsively wicked, the clumsy knave, the open thief,
and the entirely merciful, just, and godly person.'3
Posner counters with the point that imagination, sensitivity, knowledge within
a narrow sphere, and wisdom are all advantages in the market place.
Interestingly, he says nothing about covetousness or pride. However, he goes
on to argue that there is no reason to believe that an entirely merciful, just, and
godly person would be at a disadvantage in the market unless such a person
were, because of these characteristics, disinclined to production. He singles out
godliness as a quality that might commonly be thought to be concurrent with a
disinclination to produce. However, he argues that there is no sound basis to
assume that such a correlation exists.3'
In formulating productivity as a moral virtue, Posner conjoins the notion
of productivity with that of altruism and attributes moral significance to
productivity, because through production the individual confers benefits on
others.37 Thus, it is the bestowing of something of value on others that often
seems to underwrite Posner's conception of the moral significance of production.
In further defending wealth maximization as an ethical norm, Posner
ultimately falls back on quasi-religious rhetoric surrounding the notion of
productivity. He praises wealth maximization for the senses in which it
promotes Calvinist and Protestant virtues.3 He argues that inasmuch as wealth
maximization encourages Calvinist virtues, it is morally superior to
utilitarianism, which is infirm in its accommodation of hedonistic and epicurean
indulgence.
IV. PRODUCTION AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON GOOD
Two fundamental tensions emerge in relation to the argument that material
productivity has intrinsic moral significance. The first is the tension between
the idea that moral virtue requires contribution to and participation in a
community and the idea that moral virtue requires the inward individual
35. Id. at 68, n.44.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 67-68.
38. Id. at 68.
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development of intangible moral wisdom. The second tension, which flows
from a concession to the view that some contribution to the lives of others is
essential to the morally good life, arises out of the question of whether and
under what circumstances compensated contribution of a material nature can be
seen as virtuous and as morally significant.
One way of quickly rejecting Posner's theory that the materially productive
are morally superior is to take the view that materiality and morality are utterly
unrelated, and that material productivity is always irrelevant to a defensible
moral assessment of an individual. However, such an argument is both too
hasty and wrong. Indeed, it even lets Posner off the hook too easily, because
he can successfully counter the argument merely by pointing to any sense in
which material contribution can be seen to benefit others in need. A complete
dismissal of the relationship between productivity and moral virtue, in fact,
plays into the hands of Posner's rhetorical appeal because it necessarily leads
one to an untenable elitism wherein the virtuous are exempted from concern with
the sustenance of the community. Therefore, I would like to explore in more
detail the question of the conditions under which material productivity ought to
be seen as a morally significant contribution to the community. I think that
doing so puts Posner to the most difficult test of bearing out the claim that the
moral appeal of his theory rests on the beneficial effects of production and
market exchange.
In discussing the question of the moral place of productivity as a
contribution to the community, I would like to begin with an examination of
some classical and medieval thinkers. It is in these early philosophies that we
can see most clearly an ambivalence about the moral meaning of material
productivity. On the one hand, material productivity is seen as vulgar and
avaricious, and on the other, it is seen as a morally significant aspect of social
participation. Much of classical and medieval philosophy embraces the view
that virtue requires detachment from material reality. This, of course, leaves
us with the question of who is to engage in material activity to provide the
sustaining commodities of life for the continued existence of the community.
The first hurdle to overcome in positing productivity as morally significant
is the question of whether moral virtue exists in social relations or in the
intrinsic quality of the self. It is interesting to note here that Posner is
particularly disapproving of "hedonistic and epicurean values." Posner seems
to be using the term "epicurean" in a colloquial sense, but we might consider
at this point why it is true that philosophers concerned with productivity as a
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virtue would be particularly hostile to Epicurus's ideas.
39
Rather than believing in excessive indulgence in sensual pleasure, Epicurus
believed in moderation and in shielding one's self from the pain of desire and
misfortune by cultivating a capacity for abstinence.' What is significant about
Epicurus is that he did not think that the virtuous person need be concerned at
all with contribution to a community. He advocated celibacy,4 and he advised
against all participation in public life.42 He had a conception of the virtuous
person that was directed completely toward individual experience and not at all
toward contribution to the common good through production or even interaction
with others.43 He saw avoidance of all social participation as a necessary
condition for the tranquility that he viewed as the ultimate value." Thus,
Epicurus poses a direct affront to the idea that in order to be virtuous, one must
contribute to society by engaging with others in ways that are beneficial to them.
In this we can see how he earned his status as a villain of western moral
philosophy and, to a lesser degree, his inaccurate caricature as a proponent of
extravagance and excess. Indeed, if Posner was truly concerned with creating
a theory that encourages altruistic participation in and contribution to society,
it is right that he should have identified Epicurus' philosophy as antithetical to
his purpose.
If then, along with Posner, we are prepared to reject the view that human
virtue is divorced from social participation and contribution, we must go on to
consider the question of whether, and under what circumstances, participation
in production and material contribution can count as virtuous. The idea that
materiality and morality are completely separate and incompatible realms is
prevalent in early western moral philosophy.
Aristotle, for example, saw material well-being as a necessary background
39. NORMAN W. DEWITT, EPICURUS AND His PHILOSOPHY 3 (1954). "[N]o man was more
ceaselessly reviled .... His character and his doctrines became the special target of abuse for each
successive school and sect, first for Platonists, next for Stoics, and finally for Christians." Id.
40. Prudence being the first of Epicurus' virtues, the prudent man is said:
[To] so deport himself, as that cutting off all vain Cupidities, he contracts his desires
to only Necessaries; which are indeed, so few and small, as scarce any unkindness of
Fortune can rob him of them: so that since very little of Fortune can intervene to a wise
man; he may well say to her, 'I have prevented thee, 0 Fortune, and so barrocadoed
all thy ways of access, as that thou canst not approach me."
EPICuRus, MORALS 31 (Walter Charleton trans., Edinburgh University Press 1926).
41. Id. at 35.
42. Id. at 39.
43. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 112-13 (1958).
44. Id. at 113. Arendt describes this sort of hedonism as "the most radical form of a non-
political, totally private way of life, the true fulfillment of Epicurus'..... 'Live in hiding and do
not care about the world.'"
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condition for the development of virtue.' However, the production of this
material well-being was to be left to a class of those unable and unfit to cultivate
the higher capacities. So, although material productivity is seen as necessary,
it is seen as work befitting a class of a lower quality than those capable of
realizing the virtues of the good citizen. ' So in Aristotle's thinking, advantage
was both a background condition for, and an indication of, a capacity for virtue.
The virtuous were to concern themselves with higher tasks, such as participation
in the political process. It was to those who were incapable of virtue that the
concern of material productivity fell.
This tendency to shun material reality as a base and inappropriate concern
for a higher, more virtuous person extends into medieval thinking, although here
virtue and- indigence, rather than virtue and material advantage, become
conjoined. Francis of Assisi advocated the life of absolute poverty devoted to
the veneration and contemplation of God.47 He argued that the best life was
one in which one lived off of the charity of others, that such charity should only
be accepted in the form of food and clothing, and that it was wrong even to take
alms in the form of money.' He notes that Christ lived on alms and that it
was, therefore, not a life to be ashamed of.'
Thomas Aquinas also thought that the most virtuous life was one of
voluntary poverty devoted to the spiritual pursuits of acquiring wisdom and an
understanding of God.' He was of the view that it was wrong to require labor
as a necessary part of a virtuous life, because to do so would put at a
disadvantage those who, either because of physical disability or because of a
45. AiusToTLE, Politcs 1253b25, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1127 (Richard McKeon
ed., Random House 1941).
46. ARENDT, supra note 43, at 83-84. See also id. at 83 n.9, where it is pointed out that
Aristotle classed peasants along with slaves because they were both completely subject to necessity.
Arendt argues that Aristotle was of the view that it was not that the slave was incapable of human
virtue, but that because of the condition of being constantly subject to necessity, the slave was unable
to cultivate virtue. However, the interpretation would seem to be too kind to Aristotle. Id. at 84.
In the Politics, Aristotle says: "Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and
body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and
who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all
inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master." ARISTOTLE, supra note 45, at 1254b15.
47. FRANCIS AND. CLARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 103 (Regis 1. Armstrong & Ignatius C.
Brandy trans., Paulist Press 1982) [hereinafter FRANCIS & CLARE]. The injunction to poverty is
found in Mauhew 19:21: "If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor,
and you will have treasure in heaven and come, follow Me." Also, "it is easier for a camel to go
through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God." Matthew 19:24.
48. FRANCIS & CLARE, supra note 47, at 116.
49. Id. at 117.
50. 4 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES 132 (English Dominican Fathers trans.,
Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd. 1924).
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privileged upbringing, were not able to master the skills necessary to perform
manual labor." Aquinas was not convinced by the argument that work devoted
to material production was morally good insofar as it guarded against idleness.
Rather, he thought that idleness was better avoided by the pursuit of wisdom. 2
However, Aquinas also thought that it was wrong for the virtuous to beg,
partly because to do so would be to diminish the store of alms available to other
needy people, but also because begging implies the desire to receive something
for nothing that can be associated with an appetite for gain. 3 Thus, he argued
that the virtuous person could receive material sustenance in return for the
giving of doctrine or instruction in spiritual matters.'
It is clear, of course, that the medieval and the Aristotelian conceptions of
virtue are deeply elitist in that the notion of virtue is constructed on the
assumption of the existence of some other group of people who do not follow
the path of perfection of virtue, but who will be responsible for the continued
material needs of the society. If Posner's point were simply that this kind of
elitism is ethically unattractive, then it would be uncontroversial.
Indeed, even these thinkers seem to have had some sense that they were on
shaky ground here. If we examine these texts more closely, we see within them
the emergence of an ambivalence about the relationship between virtue and
material productivity. While Aristotle thought that a class of base slaves was
needed to take care of material needs, he also argued in the Rhetoric that in
choosing those with whom we would like to be friends, we should prefer those
who are materially self-sufficient. He used the example of the farmer as one
who provides for himself by working with his hands and who can, therefore, be
51. Id. at 136. Like Saint Francis, Saint Thomas was of high birth. His father was the head
of a very wealthy family in southern Italy and his mother was a countess. See 1 THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLooICA v (English Dominican Fathers trans., William Benton 1955). It is interesting
to note on this point that Posner fails to consider the ramifications of his theory of the moral
significance of productivity in the assessment of damages for personal injury. Presumably, if moral
virtue is determined by contribution to others in productive activity and market exchange, then
personal injury that deprives one of the physical capacity to make such a contribution also deprives
one of the capacity for moral virtue. This is a loss that presumably, if the Learned Hand formula
is to set an efficient level of accident prevention, must be calculated into the cost of the accident.
See Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 4648 (1972).
52. 4 AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, supra note 50, at 136.
53. Id. at 137.
54. Of course, this would not be contrary to the Posnerian view since the production of a
service of "ministering," if valued by others, would be production that counted in terms of an
increase of wealth. See also ETIENNE GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF SAINT THOMAS
AQUINAS 4-5 (1956).
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a good friend, not needing to live off of others."5 Material self-sufficiency
frees one from the temptation to use others as instruments to material well-
being.
Assisi also recognized that his admonition to perfection in a life of poverty
and contemplation of God, if universally followed, would lead to serious
economic difficulty. In what appears to be an attempt to resolve this difficulty,
and to deflect the inference that the virtuous are irresponsible in that they leave
the difficulty of providing for the material welfare to others, Assisi argued that
it was best to render service in return for alms.5 He saw idleness as evil, and
therefore, he was of the view that one must always either be at prayer or at
work.57
In Summa Theologica, Aquinas argued that engaging in secular business
was not wrong so long as its purpose was charitable rather than avaricious.s"
The pursuit of riches could be instrumental to some other worthy end, and,
therefore, was not seen by Aquinas to be unlawful for the religious to engage
in." In relation to manual labor, he allowed that insofar as such work was
necessary for the provision of food, and insofar as it may provide the
wherewithal to give charity, it was required of the virtuous person.'
However, Aquinas argued that it was crucial that one should never hold
ownership against the needy.6' Private property, although it was not forbidden
in Aquinas's thinking, was always tempered by the idea of commonality of
property and the necessity of always yielding to the claims of those in need. To
have wealth for its own sake was seen by Aquinas to be a vice, but to have
55. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric II, at 1381a22, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 45,
at 1325. Of course, we ought not to be too comfortable with this aspect of Aristotle's thinking since
within his framework one could be materially self-sufficient by virtue of one's ownership of many
slaves which would provide the necessary material background conditions for friendship.
56. FRANCIS & CLARE, supra note 47, at 115.
57. Here the scriptural reference is to Paul's second letter to the 7hessalonians 3:7-11, "we
were not idle when we were with you, we did not eat any one's bread without paying, but with toil
and labor we worked night and day, that we might not burden any of you .... If anyone will not
work, let him not eat. For we hear that some of you are living in idleness, mere busybodies not
doing any work." See also 1 Corinthians 7:24, which introduces the notion of the virtue of
working. See also J. VINER, RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND ECONOMIC SOCIETY 31-32 (Jacques Melitz
& Donald Winch eds., 1978). "When the Fathers Praised Labor, they no doubt were aware of its
contribution to economic productivity. But what they emphasized was its value in promoting moral
discipline, its merit in agreeing with the express command of the Scriptures, and its importance as
a protection against the moral hazards of idleness." Id.
58. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Benziger Brothers, Inc. 1947) at 11-H, 187, 2.
59. Id. *
60. Id. at 11-H1, 187, 3.
61. Id. at 1-, 66, 2.
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wealth at the disposal of the community and for the sake of the common good
was not.62
Thus, Aquinas thought that work or materially productive labor was not
virtuous in and of itself, but could be virtuous inasmuch as it provided for
material subsistence and could be a source for giving charity. However, it is
important to note that underlying his cautious concessions to the potentially
morally significant attributes of material productivity, was a firm disdain for,
and condemnation of, avarice or material acquisitiveness beyond one's needs.
Aquinas saw it as wrong to seek to raise one's standard of living or even the
standard of living of the poor.'
The moral emphasis on the creation of something to contribute to the
satisfaction of material need is also seen in religious prohibitions on certain
kinds of economic activity. Usury in particular was prohibited because it was
exploitative and non-productive.' The practice of taking interest on a loan
exploited need and did not create anything of value to assuage need. In
receiving money for the loan of money, the lender was seen to be selling
nothing. The rules relating to usury were developed with the paradigm of a
poor person needing to borrow for the purpose of consumption.' Although the
discussion of the reasons behind the prohibition of usury is at times very
technical,' the basic moral thrust of the doctrine seems to be that the usurer
is able to gain without having added anything to the use value of any
commodity, and that the usurer is able to unfairly benefit from the needy
situation of others.'
Similarly, Aquinas' concept of "just price" was based on the idea that it is
wrong to sell for a greater price than one bought for without having improved
the value of the good.' He argued that profit should only be allowed in return
for some kind of contribution to use-value that can go toward fulfilling the needs
62. GILSON, supra note 54, at 308-09, 314. Note that Aquinas did not include taking of
necessity in his understanding of theft. AQUINAs, SUMMA THEoLOrIcA, supra note 58, at U-11, 66,
7.
63. VINER, supra note 57, at 25.
64. Id. at 86. The scriptural reference is to Luke 6:35: "But love your enemies, and do good,
and lend, expecting nothing in return and your reward will be great .... " See also R.H. TAWNEY,
RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPIrALISM 43 (1926).
65. VINER, supra note 57, at 87; TAWNEY, supra note 64, at 44.
66. VINER, supra note 57, at 87.
67. Id. at 92. This argument seems also to have its roots in Aristotle. Viner writes, "In
Aristotle's treatment of usury the implication is that there is an exclusive association of 'productivity'
with fertility, biologically conceived, in a sense which makes it morally or economically
meritorious." Id.
68. GILSON, supra note 54, at 322; VINER, supra note 57, at 81; and TAWNEY, supra note 64,
at 48.
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of others. In an inferential way, we can see how these ideas about what sort of
conduct is acceptable in economic dealings have at their root the idea that
productivity is morally significant, at least insofar as it is seen as necessary to
establish an entitlement to profit.'
Thus, particularly in Aquinas' thinking, we see the development of a
tentative embrace of the idea that productivity can have moral significance. Yet,
this idea is accompanied by the view that its significance is always derivative
from its capacity to alleviate need. Profit is only allowable insofar as it is
commensurate with the contribution that an individual has made to a particular
good. Property is only allowable insofar as it is always tempered by the
preemptive claims of those in need.
Thomas More' went further than either Assisi or Aquinas in endowing
productivity with a moral quality. In Utopia,7 which advocates the abolition
of private property, More fully articulates a view, in some senses much like
Posner's, that the productive are more virtuous than the unproductive and are
more deserving of advantage in the allocation of entitlements in the society. He
writes:
However abundant goods may be, when every man tries to get as
much as he can for his own exclusive use, a handful of men end up
sharing the whole thing, and the rest are left in poverty. The result
generally is two sorts of people whose fortunes ought to be
interchanged: the rich are rapacious, wicked, and useless, while the
poor are unassuming, modest men who work hard, more for the
benefit of the public than of themselves. 2
More later writes:
What kind of justice is it when a nobleman or a goldsmith or a money
lender, or someone else who makes his living by doing either nothing
at all or something completely useless to the public, gets to live a life
of luxury and grandeur? In the meantime, a laborer, a carter, a
carpenter, or a farmer works so hard and so constantly that even a
69. Another economic prohibition that stems from the idea that it is wrong to gain in the
absence of actual increase in the value of things is that one should not make money from trade in
currency. See VINER, supra note 57, at 100.
70. More, who lived from 1478 to 1535, is really a transitional thinker and does not properly
belong to a discussion of medieval moral thought. However, I include a discussion of his ideas here
because he is so strong in his characterization of productivity as morally important.
71. THOMAS MoRE, UTOPIA (Robert M. Adams trans., W.W. Norton & Company 1975)
(1516).
72. Id. at 31.
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beast of burden would perish under the load; and this work of theirs
is so necessary that no commonwealth could survive a year without it.
Yet they earn so meagre a living and lead such miserable lives that
a beast of burden would really be better off.'
More's analysis is similar to Posner's in the strength of its materialism.
Like Posner, he seems to attribute moral significance directly to productivity as
a contribution to the well-being of others. Productive activity, without more,
is seen as endowing the productive individual with virtue. The usefulness to
others of one's material contribution to the society is seen as a basis of the
moral assessment of the individual.
V. THE COMMON GOOD AND CONSUMER SURPLUS
Material production may be seen to be morally good because it is necessary
to sustain life and promote the physical well-being of individuals. Satisfaction
of physical need allows individuals to develop and experience higher human
capacities. Absence of physical need allows people to view their fellow human
beings as ends in themselves rather than as means to the end of satisfaction of
that need. Because absence of material need is a background condition for the
development of other human capacities, it is naive and impractical to argue that
morality is a concept completely independent of material reality and that
productivity has no place in a complete conception of virtue.
Allowing that these conclusions are reasonable, we must now ask whether
this conception of the moral significance of productivity can be imported into
Posner's theory to support the foundational role that the morality of productivity
plays. Here we must look at Posner's statements that it is in the creation of a
consumer surplus "for the rest of us to enjoy" that the productive individual
makes an altruistic contribution to the common good.74
The first thing to note about a consumer surplus as Posner defines it is that
it can be created in relation to anything that anybody is willing to pay for. A
consumer surplus is created in any situation in which there is an exchange at a
price less than the highest price that the buyer would have paid.75 Posner's
idea of the consumer surplus captures the difference between the price paid in
the market and the highest price that the purchaser would have been willing and
able to pay. Willingness and ability to pay are relative to both desire and
means. Once we recognize that Posner's conception of consumer surplus is tied
73. Id. at 89.
74. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 82. See also Posner, Wealth
Maximization Revisited, supra note 7, at 88-89 (discussing consumer surplus).
75. Id. at 78.
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directly to ability and willingness to pay, it is clear that arguments about the
morality of productivity and the alleviation of need or suffering become
problematic.76 No necessary correlation exists between the creation of a
consumer surplus and the satisfaction of need. If a poor person cannot pay any
more than she does pay in the market to keep from starving, there is no
consumer surplus with respect to her purchase of food. It does seem clear,
however, that in producing necessities of life one is likely also to produce a
large consumer surplus. People would, if they had both the need and the
means, pay more for commodities like food and shelter than they do. Whereas
people would generally not pay much more than they do for items such as
diamond necklaces. In the case of necessities, people will always value them
with whatever they have, if they are forced. So it is true that those who
produce goods that satisfy basic physical needs do also generally create the
greatest consumer surplus.
Here we can see the similarities between the reasoning of Posner and More.
More presents the farmer or the carpenter as the most virtuous because what
they produce is of the greatest use and represents the greatest contribution to the
commonwealth. More points out however, as Posner does not, that it is
generally the case that the goods that are indispensable to the society's continued
existence are not valued at a high price, and thus, they do not yield a large
income to those who produce them. The farmer does create a large consumer
surplus, much larger than the goldsmith, for example. Because the farmer does
not receive a return proportionate to the use-value that he or she contributes, the
consumer surplus is created. More's discussion suggests that the virtue of the
person who contributes the necessities of life lies in this lack of reciprocity
between what he or she contributes and what he or she receives in return. The
status as a victim of this injustice or imbalance seems to endow the worker with
an additional measure of moral superiority. This notion of lack of reciprocity
between contribution and return can be directly transposed into the language of
consumer surplus. Again, in Posner's discussion of the moral significance of
the creation of consumer surplus, productive individuals put more into the
society than they take out, and their moral superiority stems from that
imbalance.' The difficulty for Posner is that he assumes that those who create
the greatest consumer surplus will also be the most wealthy in the society.S
It is difficult, however, to see why this should be the case.
To test this assumption, let us consider a story of two people: June and
John. June and John both own pieces of land of equal size. June's piece of
76. For a discussion of the way in which wealth maximization is always dependent upon price
and is therefore antagonistic to the elimination of scarcity, see Coleman, supra note 4, at 523-24.
77. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 77.
78. Id. at 66.
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land is good fertile soil suitable for farming. John's piece of land is not fertile
but contains rich deposits of diamonds. June develops skills as a farmer and
produces potatoes. John develops the skills of mining and cutting diamonds.
When June goes to the market to sell her potatoes, there are many people who
are willing to buy; but because there are many other potato growers at the
market, June is not able to ask a very high price for her potatoes. However,
were there not so many potato growers and so many other means of obtaining
food, many would spend all that they had on potatoes. John, on the other hand,
has very few customers. He is the only one at the market selling diamonds.
Because the diamonds are scarce and are viewed as a luxury and a symbol of
success, a few wealthy people are willing to spend a significant amount to
purchase a diamond. John sells his diamonds at a very high price. He tries to
price his diamonds so that he receives the greatest amount that the rich
purchasers of diamonds will pay. Because of the scarcity of his commodity,
John is able to set his price just under the point at which the buyer would no
longer be willing to enter into the exchange. He is able to price his goods at
exactly the price that his consumers value them. Thus, John creates little or no
consumer surplus. John, however, makes significantly more money than June
does.
Both John and June work very hard. Both are diligent and self-denying,
and both try to produce products of the finest quality. June, however, creates
a large consumer surplus by cheaply producing a good that is necessary to
sustain the lives of those in her community. John, on the other hand, creates
little or no consumer surplus because his goods would not be purchased at a
higher price than what he sells them for. June puts more into the society than
she takes out. By contrast, John is not the subject of any such lack of
reciprocity. By eliminating the consumer surplus and appropriating it to
himself, John becomes rich. If we consider the creation of consumer surplus
to be the morally significant factor, then June is more virtuous than John.
Posner and More seem to be in agreement on this point.
If June were in a position to eliminate the consumer surplus, she would no
longer be contributing more to society than she receives back from it. The only
situation in which she could reduce the consumer surplus is one in which she
was in a position to exploit need and extract from the potato purchaser the full
amount of purchase price that could be obtained for a potato. If June were in
a position to exploit need, and thereby to shrink the consumer surplus, June
would presumably get rich.
The difficulty with Posner's position becomes apparent here. He assumes
that those who create a consumer surplus will be rich, and therefore, that it is
defensible to favor the rich at the theoretical level. Why Posner would believe
that this would likely be the case is unclear, because the very idea of creation
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of consumer surplus implies an imbalance between contribution and return. To
favor the wealthy is not the same as favoring those who create a large consumer
surplus.
Furthermore, from the point of view of wealth maximization, both John and
June behave correctly in eliminating consumer surplus whenever they can."
By keeping his prices as high as possible, John increases the chances that the
diamonds will end up in the hands of the person who values them most. In
doing so, he also evens out the measure of his contribution to the society and the
measure of what he receives in return. Like the thief and the idle heir, he does
not create a consumer surplus for the rest of us to enjoy. However, from a
wealth maximization point of view, his actions bring about a situation in which
the goods he produces are most likely to be placed in the hands of those who
value them most. Those who are able to price their products at a level that
shrinks the consumer surplus eliminate the imbalance in what they put into the
society and what they get back from it. In so doing they maximize the overall
wealth of the society.
There is clearly a parallel between the idea of the moral significance of a
contribution to the common good through productive activity and Posner's idea
of the moral significance of the creation of a consumer surplus. However, once
we examine the theory of wealth maximization in further detail, we can see first,
that though there can be a correlation, the concept of a consumer surplus has no
necessary relationship to the satisfaction of human need, and second, that wealth
maximization does not in fact encourage the creation of consumer surplus. If
a person were to produce commodities that were necessary for the satisfaction
of human need and were to sell those goods at a price that made them available
to all those in need, that person would indeed be creating a large consumer
surplus under Posner's theory. However, it is unlikely that such a person, if she
resisted exploiting need or were not in a position to exploit need, would get rich
by so doing, nor would that person necessarily be maximizing wealth. So, even
if it were morally plausible to favor the productive at the theoretical level, it is
not the case that Posner's theory, in favoring the advantaged, favors the
productive.
In this discussion, the metaphor of the big pie becomes ambiguous. There
is, indeed, moral significance to the creation of the sustaining commodities of
the community, and if this is what we mean by the creation of a big pie, we can
79. Dworkin makes this point in Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 2, at 256, where he says:
"The better someone is at personal wealth maximization-the more he displays the skills and talents
to be rewarded in the system-the less his acts will benefit others, because the more of the surplus
will he be able to retain from each transaction or enterprise."
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understand its moral appeal." However, as More points out, the rich are not
necessarily those who have produced those commodities or contributed to their
production in the most significant sense. Thus, the view that a society
encourages the creation of the biggest pie by allocating entitlements on the basis
of ability to value them in a free market is misguided."1 The absence of any
relationship between success in the market, creation of consumer surplus, and
the creation of commodities that satisfy need shows the difficulty with
identifying wealth as evidence of a contribution to the pie-defined as the store
of commodities necessary to sustain the communityYs" The ambiguity of the
metaphor is, however, useful if one is seeking to endow commercial activity that
does not satisfy need with moral significance. The moral significance of all
productive activity valued in the market is assumed. But this assumption
contains a sleight of hand in which the moral significance of productive activity
that alleviates need is extended to all productive activity. Thus, the perceived
moral significance of all productive activity is drawn from the moral significance
of a subset of productive activity."
VI. CALVINISM AND PRODUCTIVrIY AS REDEMPTION
In defending wealth maximization as a moral theory, Posner expressly allies
himself with Calvin and the goal of fostering protestant virtues. He says:
mhe wealth-maximization principle encourages and rewards the
traditional "Calvinist" or "Protestant" virtues and capacities associated
with economic progress. It may be doubted whether the happiness
principle also implies the same constellation of virtues and capacities,
especially given the degree of self-denial implicit in adherence to
them. Utilitarians would have to give capacity for enjoyment, self-
indulgence, and other hedonistic and epicurean values at least equal
emphasis with diligence and honesty, which the utilitarian values only
because they tend to increase wealth and hence might increase
happiness."
80. The question of how to recognize the usefulness of markets in the creation of sufficient
material wealth to sustain communities while respecting a principle of equality of individuals is
addressed at length in Symposium on Markets and Equality under Capitalism and Socialism, supra
note 10.
81. Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 711 (1980).
82. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 523-24, on wealth maximization, scarcity, and price.
83. This point calls for a more detailed explanation of the notion of need. Although such a
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, it is undeniable that there is a distinction between
production which satisfies human need and that which does not.
84. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 68-69 (emphasis in original).
Acorn: Valuing Virtue: Morality and Productivity in Posner's Theory of W
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993
190 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
Here Posner seems to be arguing that wealth maximization gains its moral
credibility from its instrumental value to the development of a cluster of virtues
that are each of intrinsic worth. Rather than focusing directly on productivity
here, Posner focuses on what he sees as virtues that accompany productivity.
The emphasis on materiality is shifted and the idea of personal qualities takes
primary significance. Posner criticizes utilitarianism for viewing diligence, self-
denial, and honesty as significant only insofar as they may bring about
happiness." He claims superiority for his ethical theory on the basis that it
gives these virtues ultimate significance even though they are pursued indirectly
through wealth maximization. Positing wealth maximization as the controlling
principle simply is the best way to value and encourage the most desirable
human virtues. Again, the argument is mounted injustification of the theoretical
favoring of the wealthy. The reason that it is permissible to favor the rich is
that they are the virtuous, the diligent, the self-denying, and the honest.
Having rejected the utilitarian view that diligence, self-denial, and honesty
must be judged as virtues according to whether they bring about happiness, the
question then arises as to why Posner views these qualities as good, independent
of their relation to happiness. Posner does not offer any explanation or
elaboration on the intrinsic value of the virtues he names. He does, however,
invoke the Calvinist justification for their significance. Therefore, it will be
instructive to look at what Calvin theorized to see whether there is any morally
convincing argument to be made to support the significance of these virtues.
In invoking Calvinism, Posner correctly avoids direct reference to the moral
significance of the material aspect of production. The Calvinist view of work,
labor, and production differs from the classical and medieval discussions of
productivity, because rather than separating the spiritual and the material, and
endowing a subordinate instrumental moral significance to material activity, the
Calvinist view fuses the two and endows work, including material production,
with its own spiritual significance." Thus, material production is not morally
justified by its capacity to alleviate need and sustain human life. Rather, the
activity of work becomes significant because of the possibility that it has an
intrinsic spiritual quality." The moral significance of work does not derive
from its capacity to help others. Rather, it is significant because, done in the
85. Id. Of course, there is no reason to think that the utilitarian would be concerned with the
intermediary step of producing wealth. Even a purely experiential utilitarian could be of the view
that the pleasure derived from practising the virtues of diligence and honesty and even self-denial
could be more intense, of greater duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity and extent than
pleasure derived from eating and drinking. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEOISLATION 29-30 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1871).
86. LUCIEN J. RICHARD, THE SPIRITUALITY OF JOHN CALVIN 178 (1974).
87. 1 CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELGION 725 (John T. McNeill ed., Ford L.
Battles Westminster Press 1961) (1559) (Book 3, chap. x, § 6) [hereinafter CALVIN].
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proper spirit, it can be a means of worshipping God.' Its significance is
deeply religious. Work, including material productivity, can epitomize the
subordination of one's self to the will of God."
In discussing the protestant narration of these virtues, we should deal with
diligence and self-denial separately from honesty. Calvin does not discuss
honesty as a virtue at length, and it would seem that it is subsumed under the
discussion of love of one's neighbor, which is an instantiation of the love of
God.' In other words, the morality of one's relationship to one's fellow
human beings is subordinate to the concern for one's relationship with God.
Diligence and self-denial, by contrast, seem to pertain directly to the relationship
with God. I shall consider them first in trying to discover the reasoning behind
their moral significance.
Diligence and submission to a precisely defined work are capable of
profound religious significance in Calvin's theology. However, it must be.
remembered that the tenor of Calvin's writings is even more vehemently
condemnatory of avarice than the classical or medieval thinkers.9 The act of
working in a calling has moral significance for Calvin because it is seen to be
a part of living according to the will of God. In humbling one's self to a task,
one humbles one's self to God, and thereby worships God. If we search
Calvin's work, we do find a number of strands of thinking that, to some extent,
explain why God would will that each person work in a specified calling.
First, it would seem that the centrality of the notions of diligence and self-
denial in the calling relate to the importance of order. In Calvin's view, man
was ordained by God to shape the world according to God's will.' The ideas
of the correctness of division of labor and a single function for each individual
are stressed in Calvin's discussion of the calling.' A person should perform
the function ordained for him by God and should not perform any other
function. When following a calling, one does one's part in bringing the world
into conformity with God's plan. Some of the imagery used to develop this idea
is geometric. The notion of compartmentalized, defined, rigid classifications is
88. Calvin saw doing evil and doing good with improper motives to be exactly the same in
God's eyes. See SUZANNE SELINGER, CALVIN AGAINST HIMSELF: AN INQUIRY IN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 34 (1984).
89. CALVIN, supra note 87, at 724 (Book Il, chap. x, § 6).
90. Id. at 411, 415 (Book II, chap. viii, §§ 47, 51); RICHARD, supra note 86, at 120.
91. See, e.g., CALVIN, supra note 87, at 698, 840 (Book I, chap. vii, § 8; Book I, chap.
xix, § 9). For a more detailed look at Calvin's disdain for acquisitiveness, see ROBERT M.
MITCHELL, CALVIN'S AND THE PURITAN'S VIEW OF THE PROTESTANT ETHIC 30-31 (1979).
92. GtANFRANco Poooi, CALVINISM AND THE CAPIrrALIT SPIRIT: WEBER'S PROTESTANT
ETHIC 72 (1983); RICHARD, supra note 86, at 111.
93. CALVIN, supra note 87, at 724 (Book II, chap. x, § 6).
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invoked in explaining the nature of the calling.' One imagines God as a
draughtsman expressing his will in an architectural plan in which there is a space
for each individual to fit and, thereby, to reflect God's design to him, to
worship and to please him. Organic imagery is also used to explain the notion
of the calling. Different roles in the society are conceptualized as the different
parts of Christ's body. When each individual is working diligently in his
calling, the body of Christ is healthy and pleasing to God.95
The moral superiority of humility over self-assurance and self-assertion is
stressed in the notion of the calling. Here, one sees the sense in which
Calvinism is deeply self-denying." Work in the calling, undertaken in the
proper spirit, is submission to God, and therefore, it is good.' However, it
must be remembered that within Calvin's theology the individual is completely
unable to do anything to gain the grace of God. The individual is powerless in
relation to God, and therefore, it is sinful conceit to believe that through work
of any kind one could attain the grace of God.' To think that one has control
over whether or not one receives the grace of God is to place one's self in a
position of power over God, and therefore, is the utmost of evil-doing. One can
never presume to be able to act in a way that affects God.9 Thus, the
Calvinist conception of the moral significance of work is deeply self-negating
and self-denying."m Exercising the capacity to work diligently, assiduously,
and relentlessly proves the absence of arrogance, self-assertion, self-
aggrandizement, and the effrontery to God that is inherent in the exercise of
one's own will in defiance of the will of God. The self-denial inherent in work
in a calling is a recognition of the superiority and power of God.'' To
presume, however, that the exercise of the capacity for diligence could affect
God, is a repudiation of the very submission to God that made the work morally
94. RICHARD, supra note 86, at 112.
95. Id. at 116.
96. Calvin's writing is full of narration of the debased nature of the human self. For example,
in Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, he writes: "I am compelled here to repeat once
more: that whoever is utterly cast down and overwhelmed by the awareness of his calamity, poverty,
nakedness, and disgrace has thus advanced farthest in knowledge of himself." CALVIN, supra note
87, at 267 (Book H, chap. ii, § 10).
97. RICHARD, supra note 86, at 105.
98. MrrCHELL, supra note 91, at 14. See also CALVIN, supra note 87, at 786 (Book I, chap.
xiv, § 20); this section is entitled "Works are God's gift and cannot become the foundation of self-
confidence for believers." Another example is the section entitled, "Man cannot ascribe to himself
even one single good work apart from God's grace." Id. at 306, (Book 11, chap. iii, § 12).
99. Hence, the absolute theological priority of faith over work in Calvin's writing. See
SEUNOER, supra note 88, at 14.
100. Chapter iii of the second book of CALVIN is entitled: Only Damnable Things Come Forth
From Man's Corrupt Nature. CALVIN, supra note 87, at 289 (Book [1, chap. iii).
101. Id. at 724 (Book MI, chap. x, § 6).
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significant in the first place. i0e
Thus, we can see that the Calvinist emphasis on the virtue of work is
religious rather than ethical or philosophical. It is concerned essentially with the
individual in relation to God and not in relation to fellow human beings. It
embraces a paradox that living according to God's will is essential to salvation,
but to undertake the task of living according to his will with a view to achieving
salvation is to view God merely as a means to salvation, and is therefore
sinful."re Thus, the Calvinist emphasis on work is underwritten by the moral
significance of the absolute self-negation of the individual before God.
In relating his economic theory to protestant theology, Posner seems to be
incorporating the ideas of Max Weber, whose famous thesis was that Calvinism
and the Protestant ethic were causally necessary for the development of the
modern capitalist economy." Weber argued that the medieval disposition was
intensely inimical to and condemning of the acquisition of wealth, and therefore,
the Protestant infusion of religious significance into the act of money-making
was a necessary condition for the development of capitalism. 5 Subsequent
students of Calvin have laboriously demonstrated that Weber was mistaken in
his assertion that Calvin infused the acquisition of material wealth for its own
sake with religious significance and viewed success in the market as a sign of
God's favor."° Calvin, like the medieval thinkers, was deeply hostile to any
ambition to move beyond one's given place in the economic order."7 It was
right and good to work diligently in one's calling, but it was evil to look beyond
it and evil to amass material wealth for its own sake."~ An essential part of
the notion of the calling in Calvin's writings is the idea that even the most lowly
102. Id. at 790 (Book I, chap. xv, § 3).
103. RICHARD, supra note 86, at 115.
104. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons
trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1905); see also TAWNEY, supra note 64.
105. For an argument that medieval religious doctrine did not differ from the protestant doctrine
on issues of economics, see H.M. ROBERTSON, ASPECTS OF THE RISE OF ECONOMIC INDIVIDUAISM
(1933) excerpted in PROTESTANTISM, CAPITALISM, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE WEBER THESIS
CONTROVERSY 54 (R.W. Green, ed., 2nd ed. 1973); see aLso J. GI.LIST, THE CHURCH AND
ECONOMIC AcTIvrrY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 133 (1969). Here Gilchrist criticized the Weber-Tawney
thesis on the basis that it fails to recognize that the idea of work as a religious duty was well known
to medieval thought.
106. See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 91, at 14.
107. See CALVIN, supra note 87, at 725 (Book n, chap. x, § 6), where Calvin says: "For no
one, impelled by his own rashness, will attempt more than his calling will permit, because he will
know that it is not lawful to exceed its bounds. A man of obscure station will lead a private life
ungrudgingly so as not to leave the rank in which he has been placed by God." See also
ROBERTSON, supra note 105, at 61.
108. CALVIN, supra note 87, at 721-23 (Book lli, chap. x, §§ 3-5).
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of work is honorable if it is done in submission to God."° Thus, it is clear
that the doctrine in its initial formulation by Calvin does not incorporate any
notion of the moral superiority of lucrative work.
Wesley, writing in the Protestant tradition after Calvin, recognized the
potential contradictions in the Calvinist emphasis on diligent work and self-
denial. He thought that the injunction to be diligent would bring about economic
progress and would result in the diligent becoming rich. However, he also
thought that riches were inevitably corrupting, and that once a diligent person
had achieved success in the market he would lose his virtue. Thus, he was of
the view that in order to avoid the evil that riches would inevitably lead to, the
virtuous must remain diligent and self-denying, but should give away all that
they acquired to the church. The medieval notions of the obligation to charity
and the commonality of property resurface, though they are modified somewhat
in the sense that the obligation to give is owed directly to God rather than being
owed to the needy, and the commonality of property stems from God's
ownership of everything rather than from the needs of others. Wesley wrote:
I fear whenever riches have increased, the essence of religion has
decreased in the same proportion. Therefore, I do not see how it is
possible in the nature of things for any revival of true religion to
continue for long. For religion must necessarily produce both industry
and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches
increase, so will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches
.... We ought not to prevent people from being diligent and frugal;
we must exhort all Christians to gain all they can and to save all they
can, that is, in effect, to grow rich. 0 What way can we take that
our money-making may not sink us to the nethermost hell? There is
one way, and there is no other under heaven. If those who gain all
they can and save all they can will also give all they can.'
In speaking of the limits of private property, Wesley said: " ' Nay, may I not do
what I will with my own? Here lies the ground of your mistake. It is not your
109. Id. at 725 (Book M, chap. x, § 6), where Calvin writes: "[N]o task will be so sordid and
base, provided you obey your calling in it, that it will not shine and be reckoned very precious in
God's sight."
110. This text is also found in Weber's book. However, he ends the quotation after the words
"to grow rich," omitting the discussion about the necessity of giving away one's riches. WEBER,
supra note 104, at 175.
111. For a discussion of this quotation, see K. Fullerton, Calvinism and Capitalism: An
Explanation of the Weber Thesis, in PROTESTANTISM, CAPITALISM, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE
WEBER THESIS CONTROVERSY, supra note 105, at 29-30 (first published at 21 HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL REV. 163 (1928)). The quotation is found in the original at 189.
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own. It cannot be, unless you are Lord of heaven and earth.' 1 2
Of course, the validity of the Weber thesis is not dependent upon the truth
of the allegation that the writings of Protestant theologists, properly interpreted,
view the accumulation of wealth as virtuous. It may have been that the teaching
of diligence and frugality was internalized while the teaching of abundant charity
and the evil of riches was not. The general attitude toward the moral quality of
materially productive and lucrative work may have changed with the Calvinist
idea of the religious significance of the calling. I am not, however, concerned
here with whether Calvin's theology, properly interpreted, promoted or was
necessary for the rise of capitalism." 3 Nor am I concerned with whether, in
fact, Calvinism, rightly or wrongly interpreted, was causally significant in the
rise of the capitalist economy. I am concerned with whether Calvin makes a
plausible and attractive argument for the moral significance and preeminence of
the virtues of diligence and self-denial that could then be transplanted into the
theory of wealth maximization to give it moral credibility.
VII. DILIGENCE, SELF-DENIAL, AND WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
Obviously, the deeply religious explanation for the moral significance of
diligence and self-denial in Protestant theology cannot be directly transplanted
into Posnerian theory. The argument is built on the supreme significance of the
individual's relationship with God and on a particular view of who God is and
what God likes. Posner, as a purely secular moral thinker, cannot invoke this
conception of God at such a crucial juncture in his ethical argument.
Furthermore, as we have seen, the Protestant advocacy of diligence and self-
denial does not serve Posner's purpose because it also condemns the acquisition
of wealth. Posner invokes the goodness of diligence and self-denial in order to
justify the theoretical favoring of the rich. Yet, Protestant theology, in its more
thorough espousal of the virtue of self-denial, considers the accumulation of
riches to be sinful. According to Calvinist theory, the accumulation of riches
could not serve, as it does in Posner's theory, as an incentive to self-denial.
We must ask then whether, once we have subtracted the theistic and anti-
materialist aspects of the Calvinist arguments about these virtues, there is any
residual ethical argument within Calvinism or Protestantism which could provide
the foundation for the moral pre-eminence of these qualities within the theory
of wealth maximization. One might argue here that the qualities of diligence
and self-denial are important insofar as they will result in the individual
112. JOHN WESLEY, 7he Danger of Increasing Riches, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN WESLEY
(Albert C. Outler ed., Abindon Press 1984) (emphasis in original).
113. Ironically, Posner's thesis on this score seems to be the reverse of Weber's in a sense.
That is, that fostering economic progress serves to foster diligence, honesty, and self-denial.
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contributing to the common good through production. However, we have
already seen why the argument from contribution to the common good is
unavailable to Posner. Furthermore, Posner has already rejected the utilitarian
argument for their significance, so we cannot look to any tendency of diligence
and self-denial to promote happiness as the reason for their importance. Rather,
Posner posits these qualities as of ultimate value, and the question which
remains is "why?"
I would argue that the veneration of diligence and self-denial is morally
problematic when it is not firmly conjoined with a conception of generosity.
However, the veneration of diligence and self-denial has emotional force even
without such a connection and even without any religious underpinning."4
The Calvinist emphasis on submission and self-discipline provides the key to
their emotional, and hence, their perceived moral significance. There is, I
would argue, a feeling of accomplishment in mastering one's desires and
passions, in forcing one's self, single-mindedly and relentlessly, to submit to any
endeavour. One attains a feeling of accomplishment, meaning, and superiority
when one succeeds in controlling one's self through submission to work."'
Work is a tangible way to prove one's capacity for self-mastery. " 6
I would argue that the desire for self-mastery and the will to transcend
human fallibility is at the emotional core of the Calvinist obsession with work.
Even once we have filtered out the religious aspects of the doctrine, this idea of
submission to work as a means of proving one's self remains as a compelling
force in the veneration and practice of diligence and self-denial. In Calvinism,
the desire to transcend one's human weakness through a religiously submissive
kind of self-mastery is embraced as good. Within the religious framework, the
individual is invited to understand the desire for self-mastery as a correct
subjugation of the self to God. One is advised to experience this subjugation in
a concrete way through diligence and self-denial in work. Once we remove God
from the equation, we are simply left with the desire for self-mastery.
114. For an interesting and succinct discussion of the ways in which the aspiration to diligence
and self-denial can give meaning to the lives of people without a religious underpinning, see Michael
Mann, Forward to PO0I, supra note 92, at vii-viii.
115. See A.R. Gini & T. Sullivan, Work The Process and the Person, 6 J. OF Bus. ETHics
649 (1987).
116. See WEBER, supra note 104, at 78, where he describes the Calvinist devotion to labor in
the calling as "[s]o irrational from the standpoint of purely eudaemonistic self-interest, but which
has been and still is one of the most characteristic elements of our capitalistic culture." One can also
see the zeal for self-mastery in the writing of Roger W. Babson, Religion and Business, where he
says: "Teach your boy to love work like a game. Give him work as a reward. Let him strive to
control himself as a sport. Explain to him that his body is a wonderful machine like an aeroplane
or a motor car and arouse in him an interest to make it do whatever he wants it to do." ROGER W.
BABSON, RELIGION AND BUSINESS 68 (1927).
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Posner, in invoking and venerating the virtues of diligence and self-denial
as of paramount moral significance, harnesses the emotional force of the desire
for self-mastery. However, one interesting distinction between Calvin and
Posner is that Posner, while he promotes self-denial as an ultimate value, also
retains the personal preference backed by purchasing power-in other words the
act of valuing-as the ultimate arbiter of what is efficient and therefore good.
Calvin, of course, denies any moral significance to the personal preference.
Rather than resolving the irrationality of Calvinism that exists in its paradox
of the need to strive single-mindedly for self-mastery to please God, while
holding that one must never presume to be able to influence or affect God to
attain his grace, Posner deepens and adds further layers to that irrationality by
embracing Calvin's veneration of self-negation through self-mastery and mixing
it with a completely non-evaluative emphasis on self-indulgence in the veneration
of the personal preference. He accepts the self-negating aspects of the Calvinist
struggle for self-mastery, though the idea of religious redemption in the
Calvinist admonition to self-negation is not available to him. He accepts the
desire for self-mastery and self-control as morally good, but the spiritual element
of self-control as the worship of God is eliminated. Upon this spiritually empty
foundation of self-negation, he places an edifice of a completely non-evaluative,
self-affirming ethic of preference satisfaction." 7 In determining what can be
valued, the only limiting criteria are capacity and willingness to pay. There are
no qualitative conditions placed upon the kinds of preferences that count in
Posner's ethical theory.
Thus, Posner's ethical theory is a blend of, on the one hand, an anti-
eudemonic self-negation, and on the other, an undiscerning theoretical
glorification of gratification of the personal preference qualified only by the
necessity that a personal preference, in order to count, must be backed by
readiness and ability to pay. Posner's moral theory has a compelling appeal in
a society that has no spiritually sustaining means of coming to terms with the
desire for self-mastery, and yet is steeped in a tradition of moral philosophy that
focuses on the personal preference. Posner's moral theory reflects this deeply
schizophrenic aspect of modern moral culture. It embraces and entrenches the
irrationality of this paradox in a way that questions neither the basis of desire
for self-mastery, nor the moral significance of the personal preference.
117. For a discussion of value scepticism in the law and economics focus on the preference,
see KELMAN, supra note 3, at 118.
1993]
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VIII. WEALTH MAXIMIZATION AND HONESTY
Posner claims that the virtue of honesty is valued intrinsically in an ethic
of wealth maximization. It is assumed that those who are honest will be wealthy
because a reputation for honesty is necessary for continued success in the
market. The sentiment is reflected in a speech of Benjamin Franklin:
Remember this saying, The good paymaster is lord of another man's
purse. He that is known to pay punctually and exactly to the time he
promises, may at any time, and on any occasion, raise all the money
his friends can spare. This is sometimes of great use. After industry
and frugality, nothing contributes more to the raising of a young man
in the world than punctuality and justice in all his dealings; therefore
never keep borrowed money an hour beyond the time you promised,
lest a disappointment shut up your friend's purse for ever.'
Posner argues that by preferring the prosperous, wealth maximization
indirectly, but intrinsically, values honesty.'19  Hence, Posner claims
superiority over utilitarianism which values honesty only inasmuch as it can
contribute to wealth, and hence to happiness. Posner argues that because he
eliminates happiness from his moral calculus, he is able to narrow his focus to
exclude capacity to consume as morally equivalent to honesty. There are several
defects in Posner's argument.
First, it is questionable whether Posner is correct in saying that wealth
maximization does not encourage self-indulgence and hedonism. The system of
wealth maximization envisages a high level of consumption as well as a high
level of production. If everyone were fully self-denying, then the instances of
valuing would drop, and there would be less demand for continued production.
Without hedonism and self-indulgence there would be less of a market for which
to produce.
Second, it is also clear that Posner is incorrect in his claim that he values
honesty intrinsically. It is rather the case that wealth maximization encourages
honesty only insofar as honesty is useful in obtaining money and, thereby, in
gaining greater advantage in the market and, hence, society. Eliminating
118. The quotation is from Benjamin Franklin's Advice to a Young Tradesman, and it appears
in WEBER, supra note 104, at 49 n.2. See also WEBER, supra note 104, at 180 n. 112 (quoting J.A.
ROWNTREE, QUAKERISM, PAST AND PRESENT): "Real piety favors the success of a trader by
insuring his integrity and fostering habits of prudence and forethought, important items in obtaining
that standing and credit in the commercial world, which are requisites for the steady accumulation
of wealth."
119. See POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 66.
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happiness from the realm of moral concern only makes more clear the
instrumental nature of the value of honesty in Posner's moral theory. If it were
proved that honesty was not the best policy in succeeding in the market, then
Posner would no longer have any reason to encourage it. Furthermore, the
scope of the notion of honesty in a system of wealth maximization must, like
everything else, be determined by the question of efficiency and hence
valuation." Thus, Posner is too quick to claim a Kantian valuation of
honesty independently from any causal role it might play in increasing
wealth.1
21
IX. MARX, CREATIVrrY, AND FULL HUMAN EXISTENCE
I shall now turn to a discussion of Karl Marx's ideas about the significance
of productivity. Marx argued that the true expression of humanity lay in
creativity and that the individual, in developing creative capacity in an authentic
way, lives in the best way possible."n A desirable society would be one in
which people were united with the objects of their production and were no
longer alienated from their productive life activity by the capitalist system. 3
Thus, productivity derives its ethical significance from the very close
relationship between creativity and the fulfillment of human potential.
An individual experiences one's particularly human existence through
production, and one's relationship to the natural world is consummated through
productive activity."2  One comes to know and understand one's self as a
human being through productive activity, and to love, value, and experience
existence in the act of creating and loving the objects of one's activity.
120. For a discussion of efficient distribution of informational advantages, see A.T. Kronman,
Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L. J. 472, 478 (1980).
121. The tenacity and pervasiveness of Posner's instrumentalism has caused Englard to remark:
"The present writer admits to being always caught anew by surprise by the apparently inexhaustible
potential of social efficiency reasons to serve as substitute to what he would consider to be moral
considerations." Englard, supra note 1, at 367.
122. I am dealing here with the Marx's early writing and in particular I will be looking at
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 & The German Ideology: Pan 1, in THE MARX-
ENGLES READER 66, 146 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2nd ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1978) [hereinafter
Marx, Manuscripts, & Marx, German Ideology].
123. One can see fragments of this idea in Aristotle:
Every craftsman loves the work of his own hands more than it would love him if it came to
life. Probably this happens most of all with poets, because they are exceedingly fond of their
own poems, loving them as if they were their children . . . . The reason for this is that
existence is to everyone an object of choice and love, and we exist through activity (because
we exist by living and acting); and the maker of the work exists, in a sense, through his
activity. Therefore the maker loves his work because he loves existence. This is a natural
principle for the work reveals in actuality what is only potentially.
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS 9, vii (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books 1986).
124. Marx, Manuscripts, supra note 122, at 76.
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Why would this be called a moral argument for the significance of
productivity? Clearly it is not an argument that is directed to the proper
treatment of one's fellow human beings or to the duties owed to others. Nor is
it a religious argument about the relationship between the individual and God.
Indeed, it is quite the opposite of the arguments that were seen in the Calvinist
section; it is fully self-affirming with an absolute disdain for the self-denial
inherent in the Calvinist conception of work.'2 However, I think that we can
see the ethical nature of Marx's discussion of creativity in his view of all
alienated labor within the structure of capitalism as a process of estrangement
of the individual from the self. In Marx's view, the more effort one puts into
alienated production, the greater the progress of one's dissipation as a human
being. One loses one's very existence in the process of pouring one's self into
production in relation to which one is estranged. Estranged labor then, is seen
as a kind of suicide.'"
The argument emerges as a moral one because it opposes an idea of human
flourishing to an idea of human emaciation. It is not that creativity fulfills any
external moral obligation, but rather that it fulfills the true nature of
humanity. " Thus, unalienated productivity is good because it is an
expression of the authentic existence of humanity. An individual flourishes in
creative activity where he is united with the objects of his creativity. In
reformulating Marx's ideas about creativity as an explicit moral theory, John
McMurtry describes Marx's first positive value as follows:
'The full and free development of every individual' is the ultimate
good. This full and free development of the individual means the
comprehensive and unconstrained development of the individual's
capacity to raise a project in imagination and then erect it in reality:
125. The question of whether Marx's writing can be properly understood as moral philosophy
has been the subject of much controversy. See Kai Nielsen, Marx on Justice: The Tucker-Wood
Thesis Revisited, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 28 (1988); Thomas Atwater, Marx and a Credible Form of
Eudaemonism, 1 SW. PHIL. REV. 55 (1984); Hilliard Aronovitch,Marxian Morality, 10 C. J. P. 357
(1980); R.G. PEFFER, MARXISM, MORALITY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1990); STEVEN LUKES,
MARXISM AND MORALITY (1985); Essays, Marx and Morality, 7 CANADIAN J. PHIL. (Kai Nielsen
& Steven C. Patten eds., Supp. 1981).
126. Marx writes:
Self-denial, the denial of life and of all human needs, is its cardinal doctrine. The less
you eat, drink and read books; the less you go to the theatre, the dance hall, the public
house; the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save-the
greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor dust will devour-your capital.
The less you are, the more you have; the less you express your own life, the greater is
your alienated life-the greater is the store of your estranged being."
Marx, Manuscripts, supra note 122, at 97 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 72-74.
128. Id. at 76-77.
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that is, to create without external limit of range or form.":
The idea reveals a deep love of humanity and a deep egalitarianism. It is
a view about the moral significance of the aesthetic quality of human life. The
injunction to unalienated creativity is fully self-affirming and joyful. This
idealistic joyfulness in the narration of the significance of creativity can be seen
in Marx's famous passage in The German Ideology:
For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man
has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him
and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a
shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want
to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where
nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become
accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general
production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and
another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear
cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind,
without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic."t°
Thus, Marx seems to envision the richest experience of human life as a
flurry of creative activity directed at various and numerous goals. Gerald Cohen
has criticized Marx for this conception of the good of human life."' He
argues ihat Marx is wrong in positing creativity as the single identifying aspect
of people's lives. 32 He argues further that Marx is misguided in thinking that
productive activity must be undertaken outside of the context of specific roles
within a social context in order to be authentic. In Cohen's view the experience
of becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic is, or can be, essential to
the full experience of identity as a person. He argues that Marx was wrong
in thinking that people had to become constituted purely by their relationship to
the objects of their creativity rather than by their relationship to others within
129. John McMurtry, Is here a Marxist Personal Morality, 7 CANADIAN J. PHIL. (Kai Nielsen
& Steven C. Patten eds., Supp. 1981).
130. Marx, German Ideology, supra note 122, at 160.
131. GERALD A. COHEN, HISTORY, LABOUR AND FREEDOM: THEMES FROM MARX 137-44
(1988).
132. Id. at 137.
133. Id. at 142. Cohen says:
I now wonder why roles should be abolished, and even why, ideally, people should
engage in richly various activities. Why should a man or woman not find fulfillment
in his or her work as a painter, conceived as his contribution to the society to which he
belongs, and located within a nexus of expectations connecting him to other people.
Id. (emphasis added).
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a context of social functions and institutions. "
Marx's concept of free activity as the single identifying and fulfilling aspect
of human life seems to be naive and ultimately unsatisfying in light of Cohen's
criticisms. Not only does Marx's single-minded emphasis on creativity,
abstracted out of social relations, seem too individualistic, but his objections to
the idea of one being identified by a particular creative role seem to undermine
the very goal of realization of the self through creativity. However, I would
argue that the difference between Marx's position and that of Cohen is very
instructive in understanding why the idea of the moral significance of creativity
as self-fulfillment cannot be transplanted into the normative theory of wealth
maximization.
Marx's rejection of division of labor was fueled by the extensive role that
the idea played in alienating the worker from the objects of his creativity. In
dividing the productive task into more and more minute portions, the worker
became both more and more removed from the actual creative process and more
and more dehumanized in his life's activity.' 5  The concept of division of
labor was directed to efficiency and the goal of increased production for a
market. One can see this in Adam Smith's famous and fanatically enthusiastic
description of the pin factory where the process of making a pin is divided into
numerous different tasks: the straightening of the wire, the cutting of the wire,
the separate aspects of the making of the head of the pin, and so forth." The
zeal that Smith has for the ever increased division of labor is drawn from its
potential in increasing productive output to meet market demand.
In rejecting division of labor, or at least in rejecting the imposition of
division of labor, it seems that Marx is seeking primarily to reject the idea that
the single goal and purpose of creative activity is to produce commodities for
consumption in the market. In attempting to construct an alternative view of
creativity as essentially and intrinsically important to human existence, Marx
devalues the socially engaged aspects of productive activity. In this respect he
goes too far. He rejects division of labor because he sees it as typifying the
estranged paradigm of material production. However, he is blinded to the sense
in which the creative process can be undertaken in the context of a particular
function in the society. In his concern to eliminate slavery to market forces, he
loses the insight that fulfillment can be drawn from a single creative undertaking
existing within a context of social relationships.
134. Id. at 138.
135. Marx, German Ideology, supra note 122, at 190-91.
136. ADAM SMrTH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
14-15 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776).
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A question for Cohen then arises regarding the extent to which he is
prepared to allow market forces, or the preferences of others, to shape or to
define the creative experience of individuals.'" Cohen points out that a
conception of the individual situated within a community, engaging in the
creative process in the context of a participatory role in the community, is better
than a conception of the individual engaged in disassociated free creative activity
unidentified by any concept of role. However, he seems to fail to address the
concern of Marx in rejecting division of labor.
Marx saw the experience of fulfillment of human potential through creative
activity as what was important about material productivity. He did not see such
free activity as possible for all people where response to market demand could
overtake, distort, and pervert the creative process. This seems to be why he had
the impetus to isolate the individual in the creative process. He sought to
protect creativity, as the expression of humanity, from the sullying and
alienating force of response to market demand. As soon as the individual is
producing for someone else, the self-expressive aspect of production is
threatened. Allowing for role differentiated creativity infects the pure
relationship of subject to object with a social character, and introduces the
possibility that the creative process will be primarily directed toward satisfaction
of the preferences of others, rather than the self-realization of the creator.
Marx perceived this difficulty, and thus, before allowing himself to create
the fantasy portrait of the freely active individual, he addressed the concern of
the market. He saw the replacement of the market by a situation in which
"society regulates the general production.""3 Only once market regulation of
production was eliminated could productive activity have, as its essence, the
exploration and celebration of creative potential.
Thus, I would argue that the issue of division of labor is beside the point.
Marx saw the concepts of division of labor and production, driven and defined
by market forces, as inextricably intertwined. Had he been able to separate
these ideas, perhaps he could have envisioned the kind of creative activity within
a particular sphere of expertise and undertaken as a social role that which Cohen
envisions. However, the question remains whether production within the context
137. McMurtry addresses this point to some extent in a footnote to the above quoted passage.
He writes:
Bear in mind the other-serving nature of this self-expressiveness: what realizes
individual capacities (e.g., art forms) fulfills others at the same time (e.g., their aesthetic
needs). The "freedom" of such individual fulfillments is in proportion to its non-
constraint by economic form, and its "fullness" is in proportion to its many-sidedness.
McMurtry, supra note 129, at 186.
138. Marx, German Ideology, supra note 122, at 160.
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of social relationships precludes Marx's reasons for valuing productivity because
it perhaps necessarily directs that production to the satisfaction of the
preferences of others.
In any event, within the conflict between Cohen and Marx lies the
explanation of why, not surprisingly, the Marxist conception of the morality of
material production cannot be adopted by the Posnerian model of the moral
significance of productivity. In his veneration of productivity, Posner is
completely devoted to the concept of the market as the arbiter of what is
valuable. Creative endeavours that are not "valued" by anyone else do not
count in Posner's moral narration of productivity. It is only because someone
else is ready, willing, and able to pay for a commodity produced that the
productive activity has any normative significance. Thus, the artist who creates
sculptures that are a reflection of her existence and the result of authentic
creative experience, but whose work is not valued in the market, is (from the
point of view of productivity and hence of moral virtue) on a par with the thief
and the idle heir.139 Concentration on the market as the arbiter of the value
of creative activity precludes reference to Marx's idea of an economic and
political system that fosters and facilitates unalienated creativity. On the Marxist
formulation, such creativity is morally good because it is the highest and fullest
form of human existence. Once one becomes primarily concerned, as Posner
is, with whether the object of production succeeds or fails to satisfy external
demand, one has given up the Marxist understanding of the moral significance
of production.
X. CONCLUSION
A moral theory that condemns material productivity as per se vulgar and
unsuitable for the virtuous person is unattractively elitist. It depends upon the
creation and exclusion of an underclass of those who are unable to aspire to
virtue but who provide for the material need of the virtuous. Material
productivity can be morally significant in that it can represent a valuable and
necessary contribution to the common good and the alleviation of the needs of
others. Furthermore, engaging in the creative process can have moral
significance as a fulfillment of one's humanity. Thus, a moral theory that does
not give productivity, creativity, and contribution membership in the cluster of
qualities which make up the notion of virtue is inadequate.
The quality of productivity, however, does not provide a morally defensible
139. Here again surfaces Posner's equation of material advantage or capacity "to value" with
productivity. Posner wrongly assumes that the market invariably rewards productive individuals and
thereby reflects their presumed moral worth. See generally Posner, Law & Economics, supra note
14.
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reason for preferring those who are already materially advantaged in the
allocation of entitlements. People do not all have the same opportunities or
capacities to engage in productive activity. Nor is the market necessarily
successful in rewarding morally significant productive activity.
Posner's theory rests on an assumption that the claims of the productive
bear more attention in the allocation of entitlements than the claims of the
unproductive, and that productive individuals can be identified by their success
in the market. I have tried to show that this assumption is unwarranted by
drawing on considerations other than a principle of equality of individuals. I
would argue at this point that it falls to Posner, and others who would argue that
efficiency is a defensible norm for making decisions about the allocation of
entitlements, to produce a more explicit and less rhetorical explanation of why
and how we can, in good conscience, take this assumption to be true.
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